The appellant, an Indonesian national, was charged before the High Court at Penang with an offence of trafficking in dangerous drugs under the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1952 (‘the Act’). The charge reads:
“Kamu pada 10 Julai 2013 jam lebih kurang 9.20 malam di Balai Ketibaan Lapangan Terbang Antarabangsa Pulau Pinang, dalam Daerah Barat Daya, dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang, telah didapati mengedar dadah berbahaya iaitu jenis Methamphetamine seberat 4,016.4 gram dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta yang sama.”
 At the end of the trial, the appellant was found guilty, convicted and sentenced to suffer the mandatory death penalty by the learned trial judge.
 Aggrieved with the conviction and sentence, the appellant appealed to this Court. We heard the appeal on 11.1.2018 and after hearing the parties, we unanimously dismissed the appellant’s appeal. We now give our reasons in dismissing the appellant’s appeal.
The Prosecution’s case
 The prosecution’s case was well encapsulated in the learned trial judge’s grounds which may be summarized as follows. On 10.7.2013, Customs Officers, Mohd Azlie Bin Zakaria (SP3), Norazirah Bte Abdul Aziz (SP4) and Maryam Sakinah Bte Abdul Jalil (SP5) were on observation duty at the Arrival Hall of the Penang International Airport. SP3 was the officer in charge of the Customs Department’s scanning machine.
 On the same day at around 7.30 p.m., SP3 noticed a suspicious green-coloured image that appeared on the monitor of the scanning machine. The said suspicious image came from a brown-coloured luggage (ex. P10). SP3 instructed SP4 to conduct a physical examination of the said luggage. The appellant was earlier waiting for the said luggage at the scanning machine area. At the request of SP3, SP4 instructed the appellant to place the said luggage on the examination counter for the physical examination. According to SP4, the said luggage was not locked. At the request of SP4, the appellant opened the said luggage in the presence of both SP4 and SP5.
 SP4 and SP5 conducted a physical examination over the contents of the said luggage which revealed that it only contained clothes. SP4 and SP5 then instructed the appellant to empty the contents of the said luggage. At that juncture, the appellant appeared scared. After the bag was emptied, SP4 discovered that the base of the bag had a zip and when the zip was opened, SP4 found a hard and black-coloured lining that looked as though it had been stuck to the bottom part of the said bag. SP4 then felt the bottom part of the bag and found it to be rather hard.
 SP5 then instructed SP3 to scan the bag again without its contents. Although the bag had been emptied, the second scanning revealed that the green-coloured suspicious image still showed up on the monitor screen. At that juncture, the appellant was said to look pale and scared. On the instruction of SP5, SP4 then brought the appellant together with the said bag to the passenger examination room for a thorough examination to be carried out. SP5 then informed the discovery of the suspicious green-coloured image to the Customs Narcotic Unit, Jabatan Kastam Di Raja Malaysia (‘JKDM’), Pulau Pinang and also to the Bahagian Pencegah, JKDM.
 A detailed examination of the said bag, ex. P10, was conducted by a team from the Customs Narcotic Unit lead by K. Navindran a/l Krishnan (SP8). From the said examination, Mohd Nasir Bin Mohd Isa (SP6) discovered a brown-coloured lining package (ex. P17) concealed beneath the black-coloured lining at the bottom part of ex. P10. Upon cutting open the brown-coloured package, SP6 found it contained a crystal like substance suspected to be dangerous drugs. Wherefore, the appellant was immediately arrested and taken back to Customs Narcotic Unit at Bagan Jermal, Pulau Pinang for further action. The appellant together with the exhibits recovered were later handed over to the investigating officer, Marshita Bte Mohd Khairi (SP9).
 The said brown-coloured lining package (ex. P17) was later sent to the Chemist, Kalaivani a/p Balachandran (SP7) for analysis. SP7 confirmed upon analysis that the said package (ex. P17) contained 4,016.4 grams of Methamphetamine, now the subject-matter to the charge. SP7 also confirmed that Methamphetamine is a dangerous drug listed under the First Schedule of the Act.
Findings at the end of the prosecution’s case
 The learned trial judge had considered and accepted the testimony of SP7 on the drugs analysis undertaken by the witness. The learned trial judge held that the evidence of SP7 was not inherently incredible and the prosecution had proven that the drugs seized were of the type, nature and weight as testified by SP7 and as confirmed in SP7’s report (ex. P18). SP7 further confirmed that the drugs were as listed under the First Schedule of the Act.
 As for the element of possession, the learned trial judge held that the appellant had actual possession of the impugned drugs. The learned trial judge further held that since the appellant had assumed control of the luggage ex. P10 in India and retrieved the same at the Penang Airport, the bag had the luggage tag (ex. P12) with the appellant’s name on it coupled with the fact that the appellant had complied with the instruction to open the bag, a reasonable inference is that the appellant had possession of the bag ex. P10 and its contents.
 The learned trial judge further held that from the reaction of the appellant when the bag was scanned for the second time, entitled a further inference being made that the appellant had knowledge of the impugned drugs concealed in the said luggage ex. P10.
 As for the element of trafficking, based on the weight of the impugned drugs involved, the learned trial judge held that the statutory presumption under section 37 (da)(xvi) of the Act was applicable.
 After being satisfied that all the elements of the charge had been established, the learned trial judge held that the prosecution had proven a prima facie case against the appellant. Thus, the appellant was called upon to enter her defence on the preferred charge.
 The appellant elected to give evidence under oath. The appellant is the sole witness for the defence. The appellant testified that she is a native of Surabaya, Indonesia. She is married but has no child yet. She was previously working as a maid in Macau but had resigned from her job as requested by her husband in order for them to start a family.
 While working in Macau, she became acquainted with a fellow Indonesian by the name of Eka Sulliyah as both were staying in the same rented house. Eka Sulliyah was also working as a maid but for a different employer. Eka Sulliyah had resigned from her job much earlier and moved to Thailand with her boyfriend, Alex, but the appellant had still kept in touch with her.
 The appellant further stated that upon knowing her plan to set up a clothes selling business, Eka Sulliyah had invited her to go to Thailand in order to survey the clothes market for her intended business. The appellant accepted Eka Sulliyah invitation. The appellant said she left Macau and arrived in Thailand on 5.7.2013. Eka Sulliyah was at the airport to greet her upon her arrival. After putting her up in a hotel, Eka Sulliyah invited her for a meal with her boyfriend, Alex, an African. After the meal, Eka Sulliyah brought her around to look for clothes after which they went back to the hotel.
 The appellant further testified that while back at the hotel, she saw Eka Sulliyah involved in a discussion with Alex but she did not know what it was all about. Eka Sulliyah then instructed her to go to India the following day to collect some clothes from an Indonesian lady. Eka Sulliyah could not go to India as she was busy with other work.
 On 6.7.2013, the appellant went to India upon the instructions of Eka Sulliyah. When she arrived in India, she went to the Sanai International Hotel as this was the place she was told that Eka Sulliyah’s friend would be meeting her. She was only carrying a black-coloured bag (ex. P19) and hand bag (ex. P20) from Macau to Thailand and thereafter to India. On 9.7.2013, Eka Sulliyah told her that Eka Sulliyah had given her name and her room number at the hotel to her friend who would be sending the clothes.
 The appellant said that a black man came and handed over to her a brown-coloured bag. She examined the contents of the said bag and found that it only contained new clothes. She also found nothing unusual or suspicious about the bag. She informed Eka Sulliyah that she had received the clothes and Eka Sulliyah then informed her to return to Thailand. Eka Sulliyah’s instructions to her was for her to go to Penang and then take a bus from Sungai Nibong bus terminal to Bangkok. She arrived at Penang International Airport on 10.7.2013 at around 9.00 pm.
 At the Airport, the appellant said that she was asked by the customs officer to bring her bags to the examination counter. She was instructed to open the luggage ex. P10. Later she was taken to the examination room where she was arrested after she was informed that there were drugs concealed in ex. P10. She was shocked and burst into tears.
 The appellant denied that she was fearful when she was instructed to open ex. P10. She also denied that she looked pale and fearful during the second scanning of ex. P10. She also denied that she was in a panic stricken state and looked pale while waiting in the examination room.
 The appellant testified that the communication between her and Eka Sulliyah and Alex when she was in India was by sms. She said that she had kept the mobile numbers of both of them in her contact list in her mobile phone. She denied that she knew that the drugs were concealed in the bag ex. P10.
 After considering the defence, the learned trial judge found that the appellant had not succeeded in raising a reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case. The learned trial judge found that the defence put up by the appellant was that she was an innocent carrier without knowledge of the drugs in ex. P10. From her defence, the appellant put the blamed on two individuals by the name of Eka Sulliyah and Alex to account for her predicament. The thrust of the appellant’s defence was duly considered by the learned trial judge.
 Relying on the decisions in Mohamad Radhi Yaakob v PP  3 CLJ 2073, Yee Wen Chin v PP  6 CLJ 773, Ajeng Yulia v PP  1 LNS 1625, PP v Hla Win  2 SLR 424, Roslan bin Sabu @ Omar v PP  4 AMR 772, Jeanette Congcan Opena v PP  1 LNS 508 and few others, the learned trial judge rejected the appellant’s defence of an innocent carrier and held that the appellant was guilty of wilful blindness for shutting her eyes to the obvious. The learned trial judge as well found that the appellant had failed to rebut the statutory presumption of trafficking under section 37(da) of the Act on a balance or probabilities.
 The appellant was thus convicted and sentenced to death. Hence this appeal before us.
 Before us, learned counsel for the appellant canvassed the following four grounds of appeal, namely:
(a) Identity of the drug exhibits;
(b) Failure to call the Science Officer who assisted the Chemist in the drug analysis;
(c) Evidence as to conduct does not amount to possession; and
(d) Failure to investigate Eka, the real trafficker.
Our Deliberation And Decision
 In regard to the first ground of appeal, learned counsel main complaint was that there was no explanation given by the prosecution on the discrepancy in the gross weight of the brown-coloured package (ex. P17) between the weight stated in the Search List (ex. P22) prepared by SP8 and the weight stated by SP7 in her testimony. The gross weight stated in ex. P22 is 6.195 kilograms. On the other hand, SP7 stated that the gross weight of the drug exhibits is 6,082.09 grams. It was argued that there is a stark difference of 112.91 grams between the gross weight of the drug exhibits as obtained by SP8 and that of the Chemist, SP7 to which no explanation proffered. Learned counsel submitted that discrepancy on the weight of the drug exhibits goes to the identity of the exhibits if unexplained would give rise to a reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case.
 Learned counsel further argued that even though discrepancy in weight alone is not sufficient to get an acquittal as decided in Lew Wai Loon v PP  2 CLJ 649, Hasbala Mohd Sarong v PP  6 CLJ 945 and Loh Kah Loon v PP  5 CLJ 345, but in the instant case the discrepancy in the gross weight of the drug exhibits is compounded by the break in the chain of evidence in relation to the movement of the drug exhibits. Learned counsel contended that the break in the chain of evidence in relation to the drug exhibits occurred for a period of between 10.15 p.m. to 11.00 p.m. when SP8 left the drug exhibits at the Customs Narcotic Office, Bagan Jermal, to lodge a police report at the Butterworth Police Station. Even though an officer was asked by SP8 to take temporary custody of the exhibits during that time, nevertheless the respective officer was not identified and not call as a witness.
 Learned counsel submitted that the failure of the prosecution to identify the officer who was having temporary custody of the exhibits in question and the failure to call the said officer as a witness have resulted in a serious break in the chain of evidence of the drug exhibits. The burden is on the prosecution to close any gap in the prosecution’s case to secure a conviction. Relying on Sia Pang Liong v PP  9 CLJ 848 and Teoh Hoe Chye v PP & Another case  CLJ (Rep) 386, learned counsel urged upon this Court to allow the appellant’s appeal and that the appellant be discharge and acquitted of the offence charged.
 We note that the same issue regarding the identity of the drug exhibits was argued by learned counsel in the court below and had been considered by the learned trial judge in his grounds. After considering the evidence and the arguments of the parties, the learned trial judge had made a factual finding that there is no gap or break in the chain of evidence as regards to the movement of the exhibits that could give rise to a doubt as to the identity of the exhibits.
 From the grounds, we note that the learned trial judge had meticulously answered the learned counsel’s complaints in this manner, which we reproduced as follows:
“ The issue in relation to discrepancy in weight of the drugs has been discussed in a number of decisions by both the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court. Perhaps the most notable of the two decided by the apex court are Zaiful Bin Muhammad & Anor v. Public Prosecutor  2 CLJ 383 and Hasbala Mohd Sarong v Public Prosecutor  6 CLJ 945. In Zaiful’s case there were two unexplained discrepancies which were the number of slabs of cannabis recovered and two different accounts of the weight of the drugs. No explanation was proffered by the prosecution with regard to those discrepancies. The court held that these discrepancies were fatal to the prosecution case. In Hasbala Mohd Sarong, there was also present in evidence discrepancies as to the weight of the drugs recovered. The apex court this time held that difference in weight, on its own, is no sufficient ground to hold that there are doubts with regard to identity of the drugs in question.
 Subsequently, in the case of the Lew Wai Loon v. Public Prosecutor  2 CLJ 649, the Federal Court held that discrepancy in weight alone is insufficient to dislodge the case for the prosecution. In so doing the court opined inter alia, that the obvious explanation for the discrepancies as to the weight of the drugs was due to the use of uncalibrated weighing machines use by the police compared with the weights as derived from the use of calibrated machines by the chemists. It was also held that this fact is something that can be inferred. The lack of challenge as to the chain of exhibits during the trial was also held that the decision in Zaiful’s case was peculiar to its own facts and that Hasbala Mohd Sarong and Zaiful do not conflict with each other as the facts of both cases are distinguishable. Indeed in the Court of Appeal case of Natcha Dabkaew v. PP [Court of Appeal Criminal Appeal No. K-05-117-07-2012] took the view that both Zaiful’s case and Hasbala Mohd Sarong’s case were good authorities and were decided based on their own facts.
 Even though SP8 testified that it was only after he had returned from the police station after he lodged the report that he began to mark the exhibits, this does not necessarily mean that this resulted in a break in the chain of exhibits. Although there was no evidence as to whom the officer was that SP8 entrusted the exhibits to, the area where the exhibits were kept while SP8 left was not an open or a public area but it was within the confines of the Customs Narcotic Unit, JKDM Pulau Pinang. There was also no suggestion that there were other exhibits from other cases kept in the same area so as to render it likely that a mix up in the exhibits had occurred. The length of time that SP8 took to go to the police station at Butterworth and return to the Customs Narcotic Unit, JKDM was only about 20 to 30 minutes. In the case of Teoh Hoe Chye v. Public Prosecutor  CLJ (Rep) 336, cited by learned counsel for the Accused, the length of time involved where the exhibits were unaccounted for was for a span of 2 hours and 20 minutes.
 Although SP8 testified that an examination on the exhibits were conducted at the UKPP office, he further testified that he conducted a thorough i.e. a 100% examination of the bag containing the packet of drugs only when he returned from the police station to the Customs Narcotic Unit, JKDM Pulau Pinang. During that examination, which was witnessed by the investigating officer, SP9, SP8 testified that there was a false bottom in the bag containing a chocolate package marked as C22 (P17). When he took out the package out of the bag he found it to contain crystal like substances. From the testimony of SP8, it is evident that he examined all the baggages, meaning the three (3) bags including the bag which contained the incriminating substances (P10). This means that before SP8 conducted the examination after he returned, the incriminating substances were still in the brown chocolate bag (P10) and were only taken out during the conduct of his 100% examination.
 SP8 had seen the baggage (P10) at the UKPP office and he was in custody of P10 at all times except for the brief interval of time when he went to lodge the report. Upon his return, there would have been no difficulty in identifying P10 as the very same baggage that contained the incriminating exhibits. There were at all material times only three (3) bags recovered and there was no doubt that only one of them, namely, P10, had the incriminating exhibit concealed in the false bottom. There was also no evidence that there were other exhibits from other cases at the Customs Narcotic Unit, JKDM that day.
 The bag (P10) containing the drugs concealed in the false bottom had a Cathay Pacific tag (P12) attached to it with the name of “Krisdianti”, the Accused. The issue regarding the admissibility of the tag (P12) will be addressed shortly. Therefore, there could have been no confusion as to which was the bag containing the incriminating exhibits. Further, it is not unreasonable to make the fair inference that as the bag had the said tag in the name of the Accused that was the very same bag that was scanned at the airport and subsequently seized and the very same bag that SP8 brought back to the Customs Narcotic Unit for examination and subsequently examined. During cross examination, SP8 further denied the suggestion put that the baggage (P10) and C22 (P17) were not the items he seized. I therefore find that under the circumstances, the failure to identify or call the officer who had custody of the bag (P10) containing the incriminating exhibits C22 (P17) for the span of time of approximately 20 to 30 minutes until SP8 returned was not fatal to the prosecution case. The ratio in the case of Su Ah Ping v. PP  CLJ 1074 (Rep) that a failure to adduce evidence to provide the necessary link in the chain of evidence would be fatal to the prosecution case, only applies where a doubt as to the identity of an exhibit arises. In the case before the court, there was no such a failure.
 SP8 had also positively identified the exhibits produced in court as the exhibits that were seized that day and subsequently examined by him. In addition, the investigating officer, SP9, also identified the exhibit in court. It must be remembered that SP9 was present at the airport itself.
 Since the advent of the case of Lew Wai Loon v Public Prosecutor  2 CLJ 649, discrepancy in weight alone is insufficient to dislodge the case for the prosecution. Upon a consideration of the facts of the case as a whole, I am satisfied that there was no break in the chain of exhibits and I am satisfied therefore the drugs seized from the bag (P10) were the very same drugs produced in court.”
 We agree with the finding of fact by the learned trial judge. We held that the issue raised by learned counsel in the first ground of appeal bereft of any merit. In Su Ah Ping v PP, supra, relied by the learned trial judge, Suffian LP on behalf of the Federal Court opined:
“The complaint before us was not that there had been no proof that the exhibits were serviceable, but simply that there was a “break in the chain of evidence”, and the prosecution should have called as witnesses all the officers through whose hands the exhibits passed from Inspector Takbir to the armourer and back to the Inspector. We do not think there is merit in this point. The question was whether the exhibits the Inspector produced were the guns and ammunition he found at the scene, and as when he produced them as those very guns and ammunition there was no objection by the defence, it would have been a waste of judicial time to call all the intervening handlers. In our experience much judicial time is spent unnecessarily, notably in subordinate courts, in ensuring no break in the chain of evidence. In our judgment, if the officer who picked up an object at the scene produced it and identified it as that very object, that is enough, and there is no need to call every other officer who handled it.
For this reason it is desirable for a police officer who picked up an object that is easily marked such as a gun, to mark it well, in case it may be needed later on as an exhibit. There are, however, objects such as blood samples and the like that cannot be easily marked; it is only in the case of such objects that it may be necessary to call everybody who has handled it-then only if there is doubt as to identity.”
 On the issue regarding the evidence of the Chemist (SP7), learned counsel’s complaint was based on the evidence of SP7 that the result of the qualitative test, namely the GCMS analysis in the form of chromatogram interpreted by SP7 was obtained from the test carried out by laboratory assistant by the name of Zuraidah who was not called as a witness by the prosecution. It was argued that the evidence of SP7 is inadmissible as it is based on hearsay evidence relying upon section 60 of the Evidence Act 1950 and the case of Subramaniam v PP  MLJ 220. Learned counsel cited to us the decision of this Court in PP v Abuchi Ben James  8 CLJ 1011 where Tengku Maimun, JCA, after considering the evidence of the chemist decided that there remained a doubt whether the analysis was done by the science officers or by the chemist herself. If the analysis was done by the science officers, the evidence of the chemist was vitiated and the ingredients of the charge had not been proven.
 We are of the view that the instant case before us is easily distinguishable on two grounds, namely: (i) the chemist in the case cited by learned counsel had been seriously challenged during cross examination and the learned trial judge in that case had made a certain finding of fact which does not exist in the instant appeal before us; and (ii) in the case cited by learned counsel, the chemist was assisted by assistant science officer (Penolong Pegawai Sains), whereas in the instant appeal before us, SP7 was assisted by the laboratory assistant playing a minor role in just running the GCMS machine under the supervision of the chemist. The analysis was done by the chemist (SP7) herself.
 In the instant appeal, the only challenge by the learned counsel regarding GCMS test were these (pp. 73-74 AR Vol. 2):
“PB: Dan untuk ujian GCMS, keputusan GCMS adalah dalam bentuk chromatogram betul?
SP7: Saya setuju.
PB: Untuk GCMS pun, kamu lakukan ujian ini sendiri?
Tanpa sesiapa assistant?
SP7: Analisis GCMS dilakukan oleh pembantu makmal?
PB: Boleh saya tahu siapakah nama pembantu makmal tersebut?
SP7: Analisis GCMS dilakukan oleh Puan Zuraida (sic)."
 Even though SP7 admitted under cross-examination that the GCMS analysis was done by the laboratory assistant, but in re-examination she clarified and corrected herself by saying (at P. 75 AR Vol. 2):
“TPR: Soalan terakhir Yang Arif, boleh puan terangkan, untuk ujian GCMS, ianya dibuat oleh pembantu makmal dan bukannya oleh puan sendiri?
SP7: Pembantu Makmal adalah operator untuk GCMS tersebut. Pembantu Makmal hanya membantu untuk operate peralatan tersebut, tetapi result keputusan diproses oleh saya sendiri Yang Arif".
 We note that the same issue had been raised before the Court below and had been considered by the learned trial judge and had rejected it. The learned trial judge said these in his grounds at pages 17-20 of the Appeal Record Volume 1, as follows:
“ The defence further submitted that even though SP7 initially stated that she was not assisted by anyone in the analysis of the drug exhibit, she subsequently admitted that the qualitative test, namely the GCMS analysis was carried out by a laboratory assistant by the name of Zuraidah. The result of the GCMS test was in the form of a chromatogram. SP7 clarified in re-examination that the laboratory assistant merely operated the machine whereas the result of the GCMS test was analysed by her personally.
 In the circumstances, they submitted, in light of the fact that the analysis done by SP7 was actually based on the chromatogram obtained from the GCMS test carried out by Zuraidah, she ought to have been called by the Prosecution, failing which the evidence of SP7 was inadmissible as it was based on hearsay evidence relying upon section 60 Evidence Act 1950 and the case of Subramaniam v. PP  MLJ 220.
 The defence continued that in light of the fact that Zuraidah was not called as a witness by the Prosecution, the evidence of SP7 pertaining to the GCMS analysis is inadmissible hearsay. It is clear from the evidence that the GCMS analysis is the confirmation test of the actual type and nature of the substance in question. Without the result of the GCMS analysis, there would be no evidence that the substance in question is a dangerous drug as defined under the Act and in the circumstances, the Accused ought to be acquitted. They cited the case of Zulkifli Md Rodzi v. PP  4 CLJ 250 in support.
 SP7 had clarified in re-examination that the laboratory assistant merely operated the machine whereas the result of the GCMS test was analysed by her personally. I find therefore that from the totality of the evidence given by SP7 that it was she who had control of the process of analysis of the exhibits and the role of the said Zuraidah was limited to the mechanical operation of the machine which had produced the chromatogram obtained from the GCMS test. The result of the GCMS test however, were analysed by SP7 personally. I find therefore that it was not incumbent upon the prosecution to call the said Zuraidah and that the evidence of SP7 in respect of the tests carried out and the results of her analysis were not hearsay.
 Moreover, the Federal Court case of Munusamy Vengadasalam v. PP  CLJ (Rep) 221 held as follows:
“We are therefore of the view, that in this type of cases where the opinion of the chemist is confined only to the elementary nature and identity of the substance, the Court is entitled to accept the opinion of the expert at its face value, unless it is inherently incredible or the defence calls evidence in rebuttal by another expert to contradict the opinion. So long as some credible evidence is given by the chemist to support his opinion, there is no necessity for him to go into the details of what he did in the laboratory, step by step.”
 I find that the evidence of SP7 was not inherently incredible. Although a challenge was mounted as the methods of her analysis, in all the circumstances of the case and guided by the authority referred to, I find that the prosecution had proven that the drugs seized were of the type, nature and weight as testified to by PW7 and as confirmed in the chemist report, (P18). PW7 had also confirmed that the drugs were as listed under the First Schedule of the DDA. I therefore accepted the evidence of the Chemist, PW7 as proving the nature and weight of the drugs.”
 We find no appealable error on the part of the learned trial judge in accepting the evidence of the chemist regarding her testimony on the type and weight of the drugs in the instant appeal before us. We find no merit in the second ground of appeal argued and persuaded before us by the learned counsel.
 The same issue had been considered by this Court in two other recent decisions in Mustapha Awang Besar v PP  1 LNS 52 and Ilham Saputra Zainal Abidin v PP  1 LNS 1259. In Mustapha Awang Besar, supra, Mohd Zawawi Salleh, JCA said:
“ Peguambela terpelajar Perayu berhujah bahawa analisis yang dibuat oleh ahli kimia (SP4) adalah cacat kerana sebenarnya pembantu-pembantu beliau yang menjalankan ujian, terutamanya ujian TLC. Justeru, ia tidak mematuhi kehendak seksyen 399 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah yang memperuntukkan bahawa ujian tersebut hendaklah dibuat oleh seorang ahli kimia bertauliah dan diwartakan (lihat kes Zulkifli bin Md Rodzi v. PP  3 MLJ 745).
 Pada hemat kami, hujahan ini tersasar. Keterangan SP4 jelas menunjukkan bahawa walaupun terdapat bantuan yang diberikan oleh pembantu-pembantu makmal dalam menjalankan beberapa kerja penganalisan, namun ia tidak menjejaskan analisis yang dibuat oleh beliau (lihat muka surat 120 Rekod Rayuan). Adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa SP4 mengawal dan menyelia kerja-kerja yang dibuat oleh pembantu-pembantu makmal. SP4 tidak melepaskan atau mewakilkan fungsi beliau sebagai ahli kimia kepada pembantu-pembantu makmal. Keputusan sama ada ketulan-ketulan mampat itu adalah cannabis dalam makna seksyen 2 ADB 1952 telah dibuat oleh SP4 dan bukan pembantu-pembantu makmal. Laporan kimia (Eks. P29) telah disediakan oleh SP4.
 Alasan (b) tidak mempunyai asas undang-undang dan ditolak."
 And in Ilham Saputra Zainal Abidin, supra, Mohamed Apandi Ali, JCA (as he then was), had this to say in regard to the same issue:
“ On the issue of the identity of the drugs, the crux of the submission is based on the fact that the Chemist (PW2) was assisted by one En. Sabri. It was argued by Counsel that since the drugs were not analysed by the Chemist, the Chemist will not be in a position to identify the drugs. In support for her contention, learned Counsel relied on the authority of Khoo Hi Chiang v. Public Prosecutor and another appeal  1 LNS 318.
 Upon perusal and analysis of the evidence of the Chemist (PW2), we found that the so-named Sabri only assisted the Chemist in conducting the GCMS analysis. The material part of the evidence can be seen in the cross-examination of SP2 (at page 12 of the appeal records) which read as follows:
Q: Ada pembantu bantu kamu melakukan ujian ini?
A: Ada pembantu
Q: Berapa orang pembantu?
A: 2 orang
Q: Siapa nama mereka?
A: Encik Sabri bin Tajudin iaitu Penolong Pegawai Sains dan Umi Hanani binti Wahab seorang Pembantu Makmal Kanan
Q: Jelaskan apakah tugas yang dilakukan oleh kedua-dua pembantu kamu untuk ujian ini?
A: Puan Umi Hanani bantu saya dalam menyediakan peralatan seperti mesin pengisar, radas kaca dan bahan kimia untuk saya jalankan analisa. Manakala Encik Sabri membantu saya menjalankan analisa GCMS."
 It is trite law that identification of drugs is a question of fact, which like any other conclusion of fact, can either be by direct or circumstantial evidence. A Chemist will be able to identify the drugs by conducting various tests and observing the result. In this case, the Chemist conducted the test and observed the result and concluded by identifying the type and nature of the drugs. The Chemist’s evidence can be seen at page 8 of the appeal record, which reads as follows:
“...Saya telah mengisar kesemua bahan kristal jernih tersebut supaya menjadi serbuk yang homogen. Seterusnya saya telah mengambil sedikit sampel perwakilan secara rawak untuk menjalankan ujian warna iaitu ujian marquis. Ujian ini telah memberikan keputusan yang positif. Ini menunjukkan bahawa bahan tersebut berkemungkinan mengandungi methamphetamine.
Seterusnya saya mengambil sedikit lagi sampel perwakilan secara rawak untuk menjalankan ujian GCMS. Ujian ini juga telah memberikan keputusan yang positif. Ini mengesahkan bahawa bahan tersebut mengandungi methamphetamine.
Saya telah mengambil 21 sampel perwakilan secara rawak untuk menjalankan ujian GC bagi menentukan peratus kandungan methamphetamine dalam bahan tersebut. Ujian ini juga sekali lagi mengesahkan bahawa bahan tersebut mengandungi methamphetamine. Dari ujian ini saya dapati bahan tersebut mengandungi 71.3944% methamphetamine. Setelah dikira peratusan tersebut berdasarkan berat bersih bahan yang saya terima iaitu 133.50 gram, saya dapati bahan tersebut mengandungi 95.31 gram methamphetamine.”
 Based on the evidence above, we find that there is no merit on the issue of identity of the drugs.
 Our finding on this issue is based on the Supreme Court case of Munusamy v. Public Prosecutor  1 MLJ 492, which inter alia held as follows:
“...in this type of cases where the opinion of the Chemist is confined only to the elementary nature and identity of the substance, the court is entitled to accept the opinion of the expert on its face value, unless it is inherently incredible or the defence calls evidence in rebuttal by another expert to contradict the opinion. So long as some credible evidence is given by the Chemist to support his opinion, there is no necessity for him to go into details of what he did in the laboratory, step by step”.
 A similar reasoning was later echoed in another Supreme Court case of Public Prosecutor v. Lam San  3 MLJ 426, which held that:
“In the regard to the evidence of the chemist, unless the evidence is so inherently incredible that no reasonable person can believe it to be true, it should be accepted as prima facie evidence. As long as the evidence is credible, there is no necessity for the chemist to show in detail what he did in his laboratory. The evidence of the chemist in this case was more than sufficient as basis to call for the defence, granted that all the other ingredients of the offence has been successfully proved.”
 On the second ground of adverse inference for not calling the assistant of the chemist, we are of the view that such contention is out of place. Adverse inference under illustration (g) of section 114 of the Evidence Act 1950, reads: “that evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced be unfavourable to the person who withholds it.” Such inference can be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any witness but only and important and material witness to the case.
 From the examination of the evidence, we find that the assistant to the Chemist, by the name of Sabri is not an important or material witness. His evidence is unnecessary to unfold the narrative of the prosecution’s case. Furthermore there is no evidence of suppression of evidence and the said Sabri was offered to the defence, at the end of the prosecution’s case (see DPP’s submission at page 233 of the appeal records).”
 In regard to the third ground, learned counsel argued that the appellant look “terkejut” is a neutral and normal reaction, and nothing can be inferred from it. Learned counsel submitted that the learned trial judge should not draw an inference of knowledge and possession against the appellant. The appellant carried the bag ex. P10 without any knowledge of the impugned drugs. At most, argued by learned counsel, the appellant should be called to enter upon her defence under section 12(2) of the Act for possession of the impugned drugs.
 It is trite that to prove possession, there must be knowledge (Leow Nghee Lim v Reg  1 MLJ 28). Knowledge can only be proven by inferences from certain facts as well as from the circumstances of each case (Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner  2 A11 ER 356, PP v Abdul Rahman Akif  4 CLJ 337).
 We note that the learned trial judge did partly rely on conduct of the appellant “terkejut, pucat, ketakutan” when her luggage ex. P10 was scanned the second time to infer knowledge of the drugs. Beside, the learned trial judge relied much on other facts and circumstances in holding that the appellant had knowledge and possession of the impugned drugs. The learned trial judge is entitled to rely on the conduct of the appellant by virtue of section 8 of the Evidence Act, 1950, to make such an inference. Learned trial judge’s finding at pages 22-23 of the Appeal Record Volume 1 is as follows:
“ Based upon the above analysis, once a person has with him or her possession of a bag of which he or she had assumed deliberate control, then it would be reasonable to infer that the person also has possession of its contents and must have knowledge of them.
 On the facts of the case, the Accused had assumed control of the bag (P10) in India and the bag was retrieved by her from the carousel at Penang International Airport. The said bag also had a tag with her name on it and when she was asked to open the bag, she complied with the instructions. Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that the Accused had possession of the bag and its contents.
 The reaction of the Accused as testified to by the prosecution witnesses earlier when the bag was scanned the second time, further entitles the inference to made as to her knowledge of the contents of the incriminating exhibits in the bag (P10). See Parlan bin Dadeh v. Public Prosecutor  6 MLJ 19 and section 8 of the Evidence Act 1950.
 I therefore find that the Accused had actual possession of the bag (P10) as opposed to presumed possession.”
 We had the benefit of perusing the Appeal Records and we did not find any error on the part of the learned trial judge on his abovesaid finding.
 On the final issue, learned counsel’s complaint was on the failure by the prosecution to investigate Eka Sulliyah, the real trafficker, that prompted the learned trial judge to hold that the defence of the appellant as any afterthought. Learned counsel argued that Eka Sulliyah is not a fictitious character and it is not right for the learned trial judge to dismissed the appellant’s defence of an innocent carrier.
 This issue had been considered and explained at length by the learned trial judge in his judgment, the relevant part of which we reproduce as follows:
“ The main character in the defence of the Accused centres around the personality called Eka. A photocopy of a passport of a person by the name of “Eka Sulliyah” was tendered as a defence exhibit (D36). Exhibit D36 was certified by the Consular Office of the Republic of Indonesia.
 As further evidence of the existence of “Eka”, the defence contended that the mobile phone (D37) seized from the Accused had contained the record of two numbers, (+66844589619 and +66906282104) stored under the name of Alex and Eka respectively in the contact list of the said mobile phone.
 The defence also submitted that by informing the police about the existence and role played by Eka and/or Alex, they had complied with the “Alcontara Notice”. The “Alcontara Notice” is the furnishing of details in support of an accused’s defence which is given in his or her cautioned statement. Once such a notice is given, investigation must be carried out on the disclosure given and the onus is then shifted to the prosecution to rebut the “Alcontara Notice.”
 The shifting of the burden however, to the prosecution after the giving of the “Alcontara Notice”, as of necessity presupposes that sufficient particulars or reasonable details are furnished in order for the police to carry out a meaningful investigation in respect of the information. Therefore, should the details furnished be insufficient, that will amount to an insufficient “Alcontara Notice”. In those circumstances, the burden cannot be then said to shift to the prosecution to rebut the notice.
 The facts here disclose that the “Alcontara Notice” of the defence consisted of the disclosure of the role played by Eka in this whole episode. The question that must be asked is, was this sufficient disclosure? Apart from this there were no other details regarding where Eka lived, her residential address, places where she frequented or mutual acquaintances. No doubt the defence tendered in evidence a copy of the passport details of an individual by the name of “Eka Sulliyah”.
 In her testimony, the Accused said that she only knows where “Eka” stays but not Alex. Despite this, no particulars such as the address or even a description of a general nature such as which part of the city, village or any landmarks were forthcoming from the Accused.
 It must also be remembered that the personalities of Eka and Alex were only suggested to SP9 in evidence but not to the other witnesses including those involved in the arrest of the Accused, save a very general suggestion made to both SP4 and SP5 that the Accused had told them the bag was not hers but her friend’s with no name then disclosed, which both denied. SP9’s evidence also was that she did not conduct investigations because all that she was given was the name of Eka at the time, without any further details.
 Can the police or customs be realistically required to carry out meaningful investigation based upon such information? SP9, the investigating officer testified that she did not investigate the persons named Eka and Alex because the Accused only gave her their names. With regards to the hand phone numbers of Eka and Alex which were said to be contained and recorded in the mobile phone (D37), SP9 testified that she did not investigate the contents in the mobile phone. When it was put to her that the numbers of Alex and Eka were stored inside, she replied that she was not sure.
 I cannot find anywhere in evidence where the Accused had informed the authorities including SP9 of the fact that the numbers of Alex and Eka were contained in the mobile phone. In fact, during re-examination, SP9 said that the reason why she never investigated the contents of the mobile phone was because the Accused had never informed her of this. When it was put to her otherwise by learned counsel for the Accused, she disagreed. This being the case, how was SP9 expected to know such information was stored in the mobile phone? SP9 also testified that she had read the cautioned statement of the Accused although she did not record it.
 If it was disclosed on the cautioned statement that there were numbers of Eka and Alex in the mobile phones, it might then afford no excuse for SP9 to say that she did not conduct follow up investigations in this respect. The cautioned statement itself was never tendered therefore it is not known if the numbers of these two individuals were recorded there. However, the position is clear that the court must nevertheless consider the contents of the cautioned statement as adduced through prosecution witnesses even if the statement itself was not tendered. On the available evidence therefore, there is nothing to suggest that SP9 was made aware of the existence of the hand phone numbers of Eka and Alex stored in the Accused’s mobile phone (D37). Under these circumstances, I do not think that the failure of SP9 to investigate the contents of the mobile phone was fatal to the prosecution case.”
 We agree with the findings of fact by the learned trial judge that the prosecution should not be blamed as particulars of Eka Sulliyah and Alex were not furnished to the investigating officer. Without the detailed particulars, it is impossible for a successful investigation to be done by the authority (see Alcontara Ambross Anthony v PP  1 MLJ 209,  1 CLJ 705). At page 113 of the Appeal Record volume 2, SP9 explained the reason for the non action as follows:
“TPR: Seterusnya, tadi kamu ada juga ditanya berkenaan dengan kandungan handphone Nokia yang mana kamu tidak siasat. Rakan bijaksana saya juga menyatakan kepada kamu sebenarnya number Eka dan Alex ada disimpan dalam handphone itu. Dan kamu jawab juga tidak pasti, boleh kamu jelaskan kenapa kamu jawab tidak siasat?
SP9: Saya jawab tidak siasat kerana saya tidak dimaklumkan oleh OKT bahawa nombor Eka dan Alex berada didalam telefon tersebut.
TPR: Sekiranya ada, kamu akan buat siasatanlah?
SP9: Ya Yang Arif.”
 In Teng Howe Seng v PP  3 MLJ 46, the Federal Court, on similar issue, had this to say:
“ In Badrulsham’s case, the court was of the view that the failure of the accused to inform the raiding officer that the white plastic bag belonged to Noor Azlan at the time of his arrest and only revealing this information during the interrogation two hours after his arrest, goes some way to support the case for the prosecution.
 Applying the principle in Badrulsham’s case to the facts of the instant case, the learned trial judge was correct to conclude that the appellant had two opportunities to provide information about ‘Ho Seng’, ie at the time of his arrest and five days later during recording of his cautioned statement but he failed to do so. We are therefore of the view that in the circumstances, the appellant’s failure to provide relevant information about a ‘Ho Seng’ for the police to carry out thorough investigation into the probability of his defence, entitled the learned trial judge to disbelieve him.
 We are of the view the learned trial judge had made a correct finding of fact upon evaluation of the defence case that he did not believe the story regarding ‘Ho Seng’ and that it does not raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. The Court of Appeal judges had expressed their view that they have no reason to disturb that finding. On these two concurrent findings of fact by the courts below we would refer to the Federal Court’s case of Public Prosecutor v. Munusamy  2 MLJ 133 at p 136 wherein the Federal Court had this to say:
... Where there have been concurrent findings of fact in the lower courts it should not be made a practice in the appeal court to review these concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that there was no evidence to support the inferences drawn in the lower courts...
 For the reasons stated we would dismiss the appellant’s appeal and affirm the conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial judge.”
 On the defence of innocent carrier put up by the appellant, as usual, learned counsel argued that it was not an afterthought and not a bare denial as found by the learned trial judge. Learned counsel further argued that learned trial judge erred when he decided that Eka Sulliyah was not the real trafficker and that the appellant was guilty of wilful blindness.
 How the learned trial judge tackled the issue can be found in the learned trial judge grounds at pages 57-62 of the Appeal Record Volume 1 which we reproduced as follows:
“ Learned counsel for the Accused, on the other hand, submitted that this was not a case in which wilful blindness applied as the Accused here could not see the incriminating exhibits being concealed as they were, within a part of the bag not visible to the naked eye. From a perusal of most of the cases involving wilful blindness, I find that they normally apply to a situation where the accused is given a package, parcel or a bag containing contents which are visible to the accused. In circumstances where suspicion ought to be arouse, and the accused does not make any or any sufficient inquiries as to the contents of those packages, parcels or bag as the case may be, wilful blindness will then come into play. The situation here is slightly different in that from a visual examination of the contents of the bag (P10), only clothing’s could be seen while the illicit substance were cleverly concealed inside the bag.
 On the facts therefore, I find that this is not so much a case of wilful blindness as it is whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, proper inferences can be drawn as to knowledge on the part of the Accused that the bag contained more than just clothing.
 During cross examination, the Accused agreed when it was suggested to her that the bag felt heavy. The nett weight alone of the drugs here was 4,016.4 grams of methamphetamine. This is by no means a small quantity of drugs. The Accused further agreed that there were not that many clothes in the bag. If, as the Accused had testified, that she was told by Eka that clothes from India were of good quality, why were there so few clothes in the said bag? Why did not this arouse the suspicion of the Accused as it would any reasonable person? From this it is reasonable to make the fair inference that the Accused knew that the bag contained much more than clothes. The Accused therefore knew that drugs were contained in the bag.
 The circumstances in which the Accused received the bag (P10), also entitle the inference to be made that she had acknowledge that the bag in fact contained dangerous drugs. The Accused said that the only reason she made her way to Thailand instead of going back to Indonesia which was her original intention, was to collect clothes for her future clothes business in Indonesia. To then divert to India merely based upon Eka’s instructions does not seem plausible. Why did Eka not reveal this to the Accused at the outset? It seems altogether too convenient that the Accused was only informed of this drastic change of plans only after her arrival in Thailand. Eka’s request to the Accused to go to India was coupled with her instructions to take some clothes from a female whose name was not given.
 One may legitimately ask, why was the identity of this female shrouded in secrecy? Even more perplexing was the fact that the female who was supposed to show up did not but a male African instead who also did not reveal his name. The Accused said that the male who gave her the bag did not mention her name. Such being the case, how was the male African to know whether he had the right person? If, as the Accused contended, that she was only an innocent carrier and that the rest of the characters involved including the male African who gave her the bag were the actual traffickers, why would he part with a bag which he knew contained very valuable and marketable merchandise without first ascertaining if the Accused was indeed the person he was supposed to give the bag to? I therefore find that this also entitles the inference to be made that the Accused knew that the bag contained dangerous drugs.
 I also find that the circuitous route that the Accused said she was to take back to Thailand by way of road from Penang to also not be reasonable. I find that the Accused’s version of events as to her intended mode of return to Thailand to be contrived and created so as to explain why she did not return from India direct to Thailand. This entitles the inference to be drawn that the Accused intended to end her journey in Penang with the intent to dispose of the incriminating exhibits concealed in the false bottom of the bag (P10) in Penang.
 From a consideration of all the circumstances, I find that although the “Eka Sulliyah” whose passport copy was tendered was a real person, the personality of “Eka” referred to by the Accused in her testimony was not a real person. The “Eka Suliyah” whose details appear in (D36) was not the “Eka” referred to by the Accused. The Eka mentioned by the Accused was but a convenient figment of the Accused’s imagination created in order to coincide with the personality of the “Eka Sulliyah” appearing in (D36). This is because the Accused was unable to furnish details of the personality called “Eka” upon her arrest resulting in the inability of SP9 to even get to the point where she had enough of a lead to go on.
 If the “Eka” that the Accused testified about was the same “Eka Sulliyah” mentioned in (D36), she would have given her name in full as any reasonable person would and especially a person facing the perilous situation that the Accused had found herself in. The personality of “Eka” as mentioned by the Accused was therefore her invention and did not exist. In the light of this findings, there is no need to therefore go further and decide if the said “Eka” was the actual trafficker within the second limb of Mohd Radhi v. PP (supra).
 I find that the Accused had acted on her own in coming to Thailand, and later in going to India to collect what she knew were dangerous drugs concealed in the bag (P10). Similarly, I find that the character Alex was an invention by the Accused in order to bolster the defence case that he had acted in concert with Eka in instructing the Accused to go to India to collect clothing.
 The Accused had also acted on her own in coming to Penang where she intended to end her journey by bringing in the impugned drugs into this country for the purpose of disposing them at a profit, had she not been intercepted by the authorities. The weight of the impugned drugs here would also negate any probability that the drugs were for her own consumption. The irresistible inference is therefore that the drugs were for the purposes of trafficking.
 The factual matrix of this case, including the weight of the drugs, the manner in which they were concealed, the relatively small quantity of clothing’s in the bag and the improbable version of the manner of the Accused’s journey back to Thailand, enable the fair inference to be made that the Accused had brought the drugs into Penang to either hand them over to a syndicate of which she was part of or sell them herself.”
 We agree with the findings of the learned trial judge on this issue. The issue had been adequately considered by the learned trial judge before His Lordship come to the correct decision. We also agree with the learned trial judge’s decision that the appellant had failed to raise a reasonable doubt on the prosecution’s case and had failed to rebut the statutory presumption of trafficking under section 37(da) of the Act on a balance of probabilities earlier invoked by the learned trial judge against the appellant.
 Having regard to the totality of the evidence, the surrounding circumstances and the probabilities of the case, it is our unanimous finding that the charge of trafficking had been proven beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant.
 For all the reasons above stated, we hold that the conviction is safe and amply supported by cogent and overwhelming evidence on record. Therefore, the appellant’s appeal is dismissed and the conviction and sentence of the High Court is hereby affirmed.
Dated: 7 February 2018
KAMARDIN BIN HASHIM
Court of Appeal